Publications
Articles
Harris J. (2025) “Autonomy Deadlock and Bioethical Principlism” American Journal of Bioethics (forthcoming).
Harris, J., & Dubljević, V. (2025). Navigating the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Encyclopedia, 5(4), 201, 1-25 https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5040201
Harris J., Respess S. (2025) “Ordering Care Principles for Cost-Related Nonadherence” American Journal of Bioethics, 25(8), 134–137. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2025.2526739
Harris J. (2024)“Challenges for Environmental Justice under Bioethical Principlism” American Journal of Bioethics, 24 (3): 65-67. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2024.2303139
Harris J. (2022) “Moral Wrongs, Epistemic Wrongs, and the FDA” American Journal of Bioethics 22 (10): 34-37. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2022.2110967
Chapters
Harris J., Dubljević, V. (2025) “Artificial Intelligence: Tools, Peers, or Aspirants” In Barfield and Blitz (Eds.), Law, Ethics, and Superintelligence: After the Singularity. Edward Elgar Publishing 1-30. (forthcoming)
Harris J., Dubljević, V. (2025) “Contemporary Perspectives on A.I. and Neurocomputational Ethics” In Flöther, Hoffman, & May (Eds.), AI Ethics: From Industry to Philosophy to Science Fiction. Springer Nature. 1-18. (accepted March 2025, preprint)
Monograph
Remapping Autonomy in Bioethics (prospectus under review)
Articles
“Autonomy vs. Automation” (revise and resubmit)
“Rossian Autonomy” (under review)
“Autonomy in Algorithms? A Case Study in Medical Decision-making”
“Towards Ethical Innovation in AI-Driven Pharmaceutical Research”
“Don't Lose Yourself: Narrative Ethics and Artificial Intelligence”
Title: "Remapping Reasons of Autonomy Under Normative Pluralism"
Summary: My dissertation, Remapping Reasons of Autonomy, argues that autonomy does not fit within deontic pluralistic normative frameworks, and claims that W.D. Ross (1930; 1939) was wise to exclude it from his original pluralistic framework. My first chapter provides a novel fourfold system for mapping autonomy within normative frameworks: as an enabling condition or output state of normative reasoning, and as commensurable or incommensurable with other normative reasons. My second chapter defends intuitionist deontological pluralism against a variety of critiques, including epistemic opacity and disagreement (how could intuitive seemings justify and what makes them reliable?) and action-guidance indeterminacy (how are competing duties weighed?). I argue that intuitionist frameworks which operationalize autonomy as a commensurable weight to be 'traded against' (e.g. Cullity 2018; Audi 2004) run up against these problems, but there are alternatives on offer. My third chapter turns to a case study of autonomy-inclusive pluralism gone wrong as seen in the endoxic four principles of bioethics (e.g. Beauchamp & Childress [1979], 2019). I argue that there are significant asymmetries between biomedical autonomy and the other three principles of biomedical ethics (non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice). These asymmetries (infinite availability, undifferentiated weight, and inscrutability) problematize tradeoffs between autonomy and other principles. My fourth chapter identifies and analyzes problems presented by the phenomenon of value fanaticism (Katsafanas 2023); in this case "autonomy fanaticism". I develop an explanatorily powerful account of what I call "opaque autonomy fanaticism," which is uniquely enabled by autonomy-inclusive pluralistic frameworks. On the whole, I find autonomy to be structurally constraining; it shapes our deliberative space, and does not simply constitute a further commensurable “weight" on our normative scale. I close my gesturing for a "thick" view, under which autonomy should govern the scales of normative pluralism, not rest upon it.
Chapter 1: Mapping Autonomy Within Normative Frameworks
Chapter 2: Desiderata for Deontological Pluralism, and Autonomy's Place Within It
Chapter 3: Reconsidering Autonomy Within Bioethical Principlism
Chapter 4: Two Routes to Autonomy Fanaticism