"Contemporary Perspectives on A.I. and Neurocomputational Ethics" in AI ethics from Industry to Philosophy to Science Fiction (under contract with Springer Nature; forthcoming 2025)
"Challenges for Environmental Justice under Bioethical Principlism" The American Journal of Bioethics 24 (3): 65-67 (2024)
“Moral Wrongs, Epistemic Wrongs, and the FDA” The American Journal of Bioethics 22 (10): 34-37. (2022)
"Autonomy in Algorithms?" (Under review)
“The Ethical Frontiers of Organ Donation: A Defense of Normothermic Regional Perfusion” (Under review)
"Reconsidering Autonomy within Bioethics: Normative Footprints and Noise" (Under review)
"Rossian Autonomy"
"Autonomy and Silencing"
"Autonomy Tradeoffs"
"Transformative Experiences in Palliative Care"
"The Bounds of Clinical Narrative Ethics"
Drafts of these pieces can be made available upon request.
Title: "Remapping Reasons of Autonomy Under Normative Pluralism"
Summary: My dissertation, Remapping Reasons of Autonomy, argues that autonomy does not fit within deontic pluralistic normative frameworks, and claims that W.D. Ross (1930, 1936) was wise to exclude it from his original pluralistic framework. My first chapter provides a novel fourfold system for mapping autonomy within normative frameworks: as an enabling condition or output state of normative reasoning, and as commensurable or incommensurable with other normative reasons. My second chapter argues against two pluralistic normative frameworks which include autonomy, offered by Garret Cullity (2018) and Robert Audi (2004). I show that Cullity and Audi’s strategies for grafting autonomy upon a Rossian pluralistic framework fail. My third chapter turns to a case study of autonomy-inclusive pluralism gone wrong as seen in the four principles of bioethics (e.g. Beauchamp & Childress [1979], 2019). I argue that there are significant asymmetries between biomedical autonomy and the other three principles of biomedical ethics (non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice). These asymmetries make tradeoffs between autonomy and other principles at worst incoherent, and at best unreliable. They also lead to an “autonomy-as-trump-card” view, which Beauchamp and Childress (and most bioethicists) explicitly aim to avoid. My fourth chapter identifies and analyzes problems presented by the phenomenon of autonomy fanaticism, particularly within biomedical ethics. In biomedical autonomy fanaticism, autonomy claims are routinely overweighed (becoming “trump-card”), are infinitely available, are not contextually bound, and are dialectically invulnerable. We should not graft autonomy upon pluralistic frameworks as Audi, Cullity, and Beauchamp and Childress aim to do, both for reasons of fittingness and the negative consequences that arise.
Chapter 1: Mapping Autonomy Within Normative Frameworks
Chapter 2: Examining Autonomy Under Pluralism
Chapter 3: Reconsidering Autonomy Within Bioethical Principlism
Chapter 4: Autonomy Fanaticism in Bioethics