“Navigating the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence” Encyclopedia (Manuscript ID 3453773) (forthcoming Spring 2026)
“Contemporary Perspectives on A.I. and Neurocomputational Ethics” In Flöther, Hoffman, & May (Eds.), AI ethics: From Industry to Philosophy to Science Fiction. Springer Nature. 1-18. (2025, preprint)
"Ordering Care Principle for Cost-Related Non-Adherence" The American Journal of Bioethics 25(8): 134–137 (2025)
"Challenges for Environmental Justice under Bioethical Principlism" The American Journal of Bioethics 24 (3): 65-67 (2024)
“Moral Wrongs, Epistemic Wrongs, and the FDA” The American Journal of Bioethics 22 (10): 34-37 (2022)
"Rossian Autonomy" (Under review)
"Autonomy in Algorithms?" (Under review)
“The Ethical Frontiers of Organ Donation: A Defense of Normothermic Regional Perfusion”
"Autonomy and Silencing"
"Autonomy Tradeoffs"
"Transformative Experiences in Palliative Care"
"The Bounds of Clinical Narrative Ethics"
Drafts of these pieces can be made available upon request.
Title: "Remapping Reasons of Autonomy Under Normative Pluralism"
Summary: My dissertation, Remapping Reasons of Autonomy, argues that autonomy does not fit within deontic pluralistic normative frameworks, and claims that W.D. Ross (1930; 1939) was wise to exclude it from his original pluralistic framework. My first chapter provides a novel fourfold system for mapping autonomy within normative frameworks: as an enabling condition or output state of normative reasoning, and as commensurable or incommensurable with other normative reasons. My second chapter defends intuitionist deontological pluralism against a variety of critiques, including epistemic opacity and disagreement (how could intuitive seemings justify and what makes them reliable?) and action-guidance indeterminacy (how are competing duties weighed?). I argue that frameworks that operationalize autonomy as a commensurable weight to be 'traded against' (e.g. Cullity 2018; Audi 2004) run up against these problems, but there are alternatives on offer. My third chapter turns to a case study of autonomy-inclusive pluralism gone wrong as seen in the endoxic four principles of bioethics (e.g. Beauchamp & Childress [1979], 2019). I argue that there are significant asymmetries between biomedical autonomy and the other three principles of biomedical ethics (non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice). These asymmetries make tradeoffs between autonomy and other principles incoherent or unreliable. They also lead to an “autonomy-as-trump-card” view, which Beauchamp and Childress (and most pluralists, including the bioethicists among them) explicitly aim to avoid. My fourth chapter identifies and analyzes problems presented by the phenomenon of autonomy fanaticism. I develop an account of opaque autonomy fanaticism, which is uniquely enabled by autonomy-inclusive pluralistic frameworks. On the whole, I find autonomy to be structurally constraining (shaping the admissible space and comparative weight of other reasons) rather than simply adding a further commensurable “weight" on the scale; autonomy should govern the scales of normative pluraism, not rest upon it.
Chapter 1: Mapping Autonomy Within Normative Frameworks
Chapter 2: Desiderata for Deontological Pluralism, and Autonomy's Place Within It
Chapter 3: Reconsidering Autonomy Within Bioethical Principlism
Chapter 4: Two Routes to Autonomy Fanaticism